We use a version of the small-union Meade model to consider the effects of interdependent import tariffs in the presence illegal immigration. First, we analyze the condition under which illegal immigration is likely to increase (or decrease) in response to reciprocal trade liberalization between the source and host nations (of illegal immigration). Next we describe the Nash equilibrium in tariffs between these nations and discus how a liberalization of tariffs starting from this Nash equilibrium is likely to affect their utility. Finally, we consider the effect of the host nation's liberalization of the import tariff (imposed on its imports from a third nation). We show that strategic considerations regarding the effect of this tariff liberalization on the Nash equilibrium tariffs can modify the traditional (trade creating/diverting) gains from such liberalization.
Introduction
Regional trading agreements have become very popular in recent times. Some well known trading blocs are NAFTA, EU, SAARC, and MERCOSUR. However, there are several others which are less prominent. While these agreements strive to eliminate trade barriers within blocs, they typically do not achieve complete free trade (see Baldwin and Venables, 1995) . Each member tries to pursue their own interests such as the amount of tariff reduction that they are willing to concede in return for better access to their partners' markets. Also, the issues on the negotiation table are not limited to trade policy alone, but cover a variety of related problems. Illegal immigration is one of the important related issues, especially for PTAs that involve bordering nations.
Illegal immigration has been a serious problem in NAFTA, especially along the US-Mexico border. Recent estimates (see Orrenius 2001) The literature on regional trade agreements has explored a variety of issues (see for example, Ethier and Horn, 1984, Baldwin and Venables, 1995, Bhagwati, Krishna, 1 NAFTA negotiations/documents discuss both tariff liberalization and ways to control illegal labor flows. Former Attorney General Reno called the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico "..our best hope for reducing illegal immigration over the long haul." http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101293-fact-sheet-onnafta-notes.htm and Panagariya, 1999) . Ethier and Horn (1984) have shown that (i) marginal reduction of tariff improves joint welfare of a trade bloc starting from non-discriminatory tariff, and (ii) marginal increase in internal tariff improves joint welfare of trade bloc starting from free intra-trade bloc in a tariff-ridden world. These imply the presence of a positive internal tariff. Panagariya (1999) derives the second best tariff within the context of the Meade Model. In addition to the analysis of marginal changes in tariffs, the literature has explored welfare implications of complete tariff elimination. Panagariya and Krishna (2002) consider circumstances under which an FTA must improve the joint welfare of the bloc.
While the existing literature has deepened our understanding of the nature of second best trade taxes and of welfare implications of regional integration, it has not adequately addressed the issue of illegal immigration. The agenda of this paper is to contribute towards improving our understanding of this issue by complementing the existing literature in four ways. First, we consider how mutual tariff reductions by potential bloc members (who are respectively the host and source nations for illegal immigration) alter the level of illegal immigration. Second, we describe the pre-existing non-cooperative tariff equilibrium for potential bloc members. Third, we analyze the welfare effect of intra-bloc tariff liberalization starting from the Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we explore the effect on the host nation (of illegal immigration) of a liberalization of its trade with respect to a third nation (outside of the potential bloc).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model and analysis. Section 3 concludes.
The Small Union Case
We use the small-union Meade model used in Panagariya (1999) and Bandyopadhyay (2006) . There are three nations, A, B, and C. A and B form a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). There are three goods; good-1, 2, and 3. A and B both produce goods 1 and 2. A exports good-1 and imports goods 2 and 3. B exports good-2 and imports goods 1 and 3. C produces and exports good-3 while it imports goods 1 and 2. We assume A and B impose import tariffs while C pursues free trade.
Trade liberalization within the bloc takes place as A reduces (or eliminates) import tariff on good-2 and B does the same for its import tariff on good-1. These tariffs may be denoted as internal tariffs (internal to the bloc) while the tariffs by A and B on good-3 are their respective external tariffs. We abstract from strategic interactions in trade policy between the Bloc and the rest of the world, and focus on intra-bloc strategic tariffs, tariff liberalization and how it affects the illegal immigration problem.
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Nation A is the host country for illegal immigration, while B is the source country.
Illegal immigrants send earnings back to B, thus A does not retain immigrant's factor rewards (for example, Orrenius (2001) states that: "The out-migration of Mexican citizens brings in $4 billion to $7 billion in remittances each year."). Since prices (without tariffs) are given exogenously to the small countries within the bloc, we 2 Bandyopadhyay (2006) does address tariffs and illegal immigration. However, unlike this paper he ignores the interdependence in trade policy between the bloc members. The role of the latter and how it affects illegal immigration and national welfare is the central focus of this paper. We should note that interdependence in trade policy is discussed (between a trading bloc and the rest of the world) in Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) and Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004) . Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) among others shed light on the mutual negotiation process. They examine how formation of customs union with a certain country affects its trade agreements with other countries (multilateral agreements). Their paper derives external tariff response functions of the customs union and the rest of world, and thus provides the conditions under which both a customs union and multilateral trade agreements are sustainable. Our paper differs from the Bond et al. papers 
We assume that revenue function is strictly concave in endowment, V , such that 0
. Following Ethier (1986) and Bond and Chen (1987) , we use the following assumptions. Firms can hire legal workers and pay A W or hire illegal workers and pay I W . However, if firms are detected to be hiring illegal immigrants, they are fined z per unit of illegal labor. There is a probability of detection, which depends on the level of internal enforcement. This is denoted as: . Assuming risk neutrality, the equilibrium migration condition dictates that the certainty wage in B is equated to the net expected wage from migration:
The effect of trade liberalization on the level of illegal immigration
This section considers the effect of trade liberalization on illegal immigration.
Notice that:
(.)
for i = A and B. Thus, equations (4) and (5) imply:
≡ β ρ
. Relation-(6) implicitly defines the level of illegal immigration as:
Using (6) and (7), the effects of each policy instrument on immigration are:
Tariffs change the domestic import prices and hence the wage rates. These in turn affect the incentive for illegal immigration. We show below that the precise effect of the tariff on the immigration flow depends on the characteristics of the labor markets of both nations (host and the source). The parameter ρ captures enforcement policy, and we suppress it (for now) to focus on the effect of tariff changes on illegal immigration. Proof:
Using (7):
Then, from (8) and (9) 
The Pre-Agreement Nash Tariff Equilibrium
Here we describe the utility maximizing Nash tariffs of nations A and B on imports from each other (given their respective tariffs on good-3 which is imported from C). A chooses its utility maximizing tariff on import of good-2 ( 2 A t ), under the Nash assumption that 1 B t is unaffected by this choice. Also, 3
A t is assumed to be exogenous to this choice.
Given a positive 3
A t , and its associated trade distortion, the utility maximizing tariff is a "second-best" tariff. As in the existing literature, such a second best tariff partially offsets distortions created in the other sector (by 3 0 A t > ). But there is another factor that is central to this paper. As we have shown in the previous sub-section, tariffs of both the A and B (along with A's enforcement choice) affect the level of illegal immigration. In turn, this affects the choice of second best tariffs for both nations. This factor also makes the utility functions of the two nations interdependent on each other's tariffs. Thus the second best tariff for say A has to be chosen under some strategic assumption that it makes about B's choice of tariffs. We make the traditional simultaneous Nash move assumption that A assumes that when it adjusts its tariff, B's tariff is not be affected. We first derive the Nash reaction functions for each nation's second best tariffs. Next we explore the conditions that determine the slope of these reaction functions (i.e., whether the tariffs are strategic substitutes or complements). Finally, we describe the Nash second-best tariff equilibrium. From (1) and (4), we obtain:
This implicitly defines: 
Using the expenditure -revenue identity (1):
, where, 0
assuming normality of all goods.
The second term in (14) captures the utility effect of a unit rise in the illegal immigration level. The rise in (.) I has three effects: (a). it raises the government's expected fine collections; (b). it leads to expansion (or contraction) of domestic production of good 2 through the Rybczynski effect and this affects import duty collections; and, (c). it reduces the legal wage in A (through an expanded labor supply) leading to a lower wage payment to illegal labor. The latter is a terms of trade gain for a labor importing nation.
Relations (14) and (15) 
Using (15) in (14) 
Using (17) (1 ) From (19b) it is clear that there is no guarantee that the Nash utility maximizing tariff for A is positive. It is clear that if good-2 is a complement for good-3 (i.e., if 32 0 A E < ), then this effect by itself will call for a negative (second best) tariff on good-2 (given 3 0 t > ).
This is because a reduction in the price of good-2 will raise the demand for good-3 under complemantarity. The latter reduces the distortion caused by the tariff on good-3. The other effect on the second best tariff is similar to that explained in Bandyopadhyay it is optimal to impose a negative tariff. Along the same lines, one can explore the conditions that will justify a positive second best tariff.
Relation-(19a) [or (19b)] implicitly defines the Nash tariff reaction function for A.
The slope of A's reaction function is:
Similarly, we obtain B's reaction function:
Alternately, the (Nash) second best tariff for B may be expressed as: R is positive and β is sufficiently small such that:
The (inverse of) slope of B's reaction function is:
It is clear from (20) and (22) that the sign of the two reaction functions must be the same.
If the signs of 2
A V R and 1
B V
R are the same (positive or negative), the reaction functions must be positively sloped, otherwise they are negatively sloped.
Relations (17), (18), (19) and (21) can be simultaneously solved to obtain the Nash equilibrium tariff rates for A and B, as well as the optimal enforcement levels i e
and b e for nation-A. The Nash tariff equilibrium for negatively sloped reaction functions is demonstrated in figure-1.
[graph 1] around here.
The effect of a Preferential Trade Liberalization at the Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze how the national welfare levels of A and B are affected if both nations agree to reduce tariffs starting from the initial Nash tariff equilibrium.
The literature on second best tariffs (in the absence of illegal immigration considerations)
suggests that liberalization may or may not raise welfare in an already distorted economy. 4 We explore how illegal immigration affects this conclusion and identify conditions under which liberalization will be welfare improving. The following proposition formally states our findings. 
Proof:
Evaluating the derivatives at the Nash equilibrium and using A's first order conditions for the choices of 2 A t , i e and b e , we get:
Using the (Nash) first order condition for the choice of 2 t e e )]. Similarly, analyzing the effect of a change in A's liberalization on B's utility (evaluated at the Nash equilibrium), we obtain:
where, First, we see how the reaction function of A is affected by the reduction of the tariff on good 3. Second, we examine how this will affect the Nash equilibrium tariff of B. Finally, we explore how this affects A's utility . 6 From (20) and (22), the slopes of the reaction functions do not change in response to the change in the tariff on good on 3.
Denoting the left hand side of (19a) as [graph 2] around here 5 For simplicity, let us assume that B's tariff on good-3 is still exogenously given for this two stage model. 6 Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) discuss how trade liberalization in a customs union affects the multilateral trading process. They find that intra-bloc trade liberalization which requires the reduction of the external tariff is negatively associated with the elasticity of substitution between member and nonmember goods. 
The second term on the right hand side of (26b) will be positive if The latter is a terms of trade loss for A and will deter A from liberalizing its tariff on good-3.
Proposition 2.
Reduction of A's tariff on good-3 leads to a higher Nash equilibrium tariff on good-1 by B when goods 2 and 3 are Hicksian substitutes (for A) and when the tariff reaction functions are downward sloping (i.e., tariffs on goods 1 and 2 are strategic substitutes for each other). The strategic effect moderates A's potential gains from tariff liberalization on good-3.
Proof:
The text preceding the proposition constitutes the proof. ■
Conclusion
The paper focuses on the interdependence of second best tariffs for potential members of a preferential trading bloc in the presence of illegal immigration between them. We identify conditions that determine the effect of such tariff liberalization on illegal immigration. We also describe the Nash equilibrium tariffs that exist in the absence of any agreement and use them as a benchmark to discuss potential utility gains from intra-bloc liberalization. 
, and using it in the last equality in (A2) above, we get (19a) of the text.
Furthermore, using (17), we have
. We substitute this in (A2) and obtain (19b).
Deriving B's Second Best Nash Tariff Reaction Function:
Totally differentiating (2), and using (5) 
The effect of A's tariff reduction on B's utility: (Proposition 1 part a)
Based on (A3), and given the optimal enforcement ) , ( 
